罗伯特·威尔逊

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罗伯特·威尔逊 (Robert Wilson)

罗伯特·威尔逊 (Robert Wilson，1937年-)：产业组织理论早期代表人物之一,拍卖与竞标机制设计的权威学者

　　罗伯特•威尔逊1963年获得哈佛大学商业管理博士学位。。威尔逊曾当选为美国科学院院士（1994）和世界计量经济学会主席（1999）。现任斯坦福大学商学院教授。

　　其研究与教学涉及市场设计、定价、谈判、及有关产业组织与信息经济学的相关主题。他是一个博弈论专家。作为产业组织理论早期代表人物之一，他在价格理论、市场设计等领域作出了突出贡献。

　　从1970年代起，威尔逊从事博弈论研究，并作出了重要贡献，尤其是他和克莱珀斯（Kreps）一起提出的序贯均衡概念（Kreps＆Wilson1982），是对不完全信息动态博弈的解的概念的重要突破。

　　从1980年代起，威尔逊对于拍卖机制设计的理论与应用的研究取得重要成果，成为电信、交通和能源等领域的拍卖与竞标机制设计的权威学者。1993年，威尔逊的价格机制研究的集大成之作《非线性定价》由牛津大学出版社出版，该书对费率设计和电信、交通和能源等公用事业相关主题进行了百科全书式的分析，该权威著作为他赢得了很高荣誉。

　　Robert Wilson is the Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, at the Stanford Business School, where he has been on the faculty since 1964. His research and teaching are on market design, pricing, negotiation, and related topics concerning industrial organization and information economics. He is an expert on game theory and its applications.

　　Dr. Wilson has been a major contributor to auction designs and competitive bidding strategies in the oil, communication, and power industries, and to the design of innovative pricing schemes. His work on pricing of priority service for electric power has been implemented in the utility industry. His book on Nonlinear Pricing (Oxford Press, 1993) is an encyclopedic analysis of tariff design and related topics for public utilities, including power, communications, and transport; it won the 1995 Leo Melamed Prize, awarded biannually by the University of Chicago for “outstanding scholarship by a business professor.” His work on game theory includes wage bargaining and strikes, and in legal contexts, settlement negotiations. He has authored some of the basic studies of reputational effects in predatory pricing, price wars, and other competitive battles.

　　He has published approximately a hundred articles in professional journals and books since completing the Bachelor, Master, and Doctoral degrees at Harvard College and the Harvard Business School. He has been an associate editor of several journals, and delivered several public lectures. He is an elected member of the National Academy of Sciences, a designated distinguished fellow of the American Economic Association, and a fellow, former officer and Council member of the Econometric Society. The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration conferred an honorary Doctor of Economics degree in 1986, and the University of Chicago, an honorary Doctor of Laws degree in 1995.

　　On problems of pricing strategy, he has advised the U.S. Department of the Interior and oil companies (on bidding for offshore leases), the Electric Power Research Institute (on pricing of electric power, design of priority service systems, design of wholesale markets, funding of basic research, and risk analysis of environmental hazards and climate change), and the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (on pricing product lines in high technology industries). With Paul Milgrom he designed for Pacific Bell the auction of spectrum licenses adopted by the FCC, and subsequently worked on the bidding strategy team, and later for other firms. He contributed to the designs of the power exchange and auctions of ancillary services in California, and he has continued to advise EPRI, the California Power Exchange, the California, New England, and Ontario System Operators, the Canadian Competition Bureau, Energy Ministries of several countries, and others involved in the design of auctions for electricity, power and gas transmission, and telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere. His designs of other auctions have been adopted by private firms. He has been an expert witness on antitrust and securities matters.

• "Information, Efficiency and the Core of an Economy", 1978, Econometrica
• "Reputation and Imperfect Information", with D.M. Kreps, 1982, JET
• "Sequential Equilibria", with D.M. Kreps, 1982, Econometrica
• "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma", with D.M. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, 1982, JET
• "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions", 1985, Econometrica